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Revisiting Russo-Japanese Hegemonic Rivalry  
 










Abstract. Illustrating overlooked aspects of a hegemonic conflict surrounding the Korean 
peninsula amidst changing geopolitical dynamics in the Far East before the Russo-Japanese war, 
this analysis provides an alternate reading of international history during the age of “New 
Imperialism”. With Korea’s railroad system enmeshed with Russo-Japanese rivalry in Northeast 
Asia, a technologically inferior Korea could only resort to concession diplomacy and, relatedly, 
neutralisation – also attempted by Russia – to preserve its fragile independence. Despite the high 
hopes that accompanied them, such efforts were unable to protect Korea and its railroads from 





Originally conceived to transport passengers and material goods in the nineteenth century, the 
political establishments in modern and modernising Powers learnt to appreciate the economic 
and military dimensions of railways, as the combination of steam locomotion and iron rails 
allowed armies to deploy quickly a large number of their forces over long distances. Strategic 
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planners equated the establishment of a railhead in a territory with a military presence.1 Britain 
was the first major Power to recognise the importance of railroads as a means to buttress its 
overseas Imperial interests, constructing railways in India. France, Germany, Russia, and Japan 
later joined it, all intent on expanding their spheres of influence in continental Asia. The latter 
two Powers turned their geostrategic focus on Korea’s railroad concessions.  
There are several scholarly works on the major Powers’ competition for railroad 
concessions in Korea. Whilst focusing on the Trans-Siberian Railway [TSR], Seonghak Gang 
also touches the nexus of Korean railroads and Russia’s Far Eastern geostrategy.2 Cheolwu Yi 
investigates Japan’s Imperial designs to control the railroads in Korea and Korean efforts to 
resist them. 3 Taeheon Jeong reckons that Japan’s exploitation of Korean railroads facilitated 
Japanese expansion into continental Asia. 4  The Japanese scholar, Yūichi Inoue, places the 
international history of East Asian railroads within the framework of the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance;5 whilst Yoshihisa T. Matsusaka contends that Japan counted on Korean railroads to 
cement Tokyo’s presence in Manchuria.6 Amongst Western scholars, Ian Nish faults competition 
for control of key Chinese and Korean railroads as triggering the Russo-Japanese war.7 Steven J. 
Ericson emphasises strategic motives that shaped Tokyo’s decision to acquire the main railways 
in Korea, revealing an intimate partnership between Japan’s commercial interests and its 
government.8 Felix Patrikeeff and Harold Shukman detail the evolution of symbiosis between 
railroads and empires, explaining how Russo-Japanese competition over railroads affected their 
bid for hegemonic control in the Far East.9  
These studies, however, tend to discount the complex geopolitical landscape that 
influenced Korea’s railroad concession diplomacy. Above all, no studies discuss neutralisation, a 
concept floated to reduce the probability of direct conflict between Japan and Russia over Korea. 
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This analysis delves deeper into the critical role played by the Korean railroad system in shaping 
Russo-Japanese rivalry before 1904, carefully illustrating multi-level diplomatic interactions 
amongst Japan, Russia, and Korea involving this critical infrastructure. Ultimately, the Russo-
Japanese race to control Korean railroads prevented Korea from exerting effective autonomy on 
the regional stage through balanced diplomacy and neutralisation.    
Severely weakened by the Second Opium War from 1856 to 1860, China signed the 
Treaty of Beijing in 1860 with Britain, France, and Russia. Subsequently, the Russians acquired 
the Maritime Province, contiguous with eastern Manchuria, allowing it to use this territory as a 
bridgehead for expansion into the Far East. This treaty also meant Korea would share a border 
with Russia, portending a closer interaction between the two monarchies. The TSR epitomised 
this new strategic reality. In 1856, the governor-general of Eastern Siberia, Nikolay N. 
Muravyov-Amursky, suggested building a railroad to defend better Russia’s Far Eastern 
domain.10 Construction plans for the TSR took shape when Foreign Minister Nikolay de Giers 
received letters from a Ministry consultant in 1880 contending, amidst China’s increasing 
military spending, that Russia had to strengthen its navy at Vladivostok and expand its military 
presence along the Siberian border. This consultant added that the Siberian railway would be the 
most effective mechanism.11  
In 1886, the governor-generals of Amur, Andrey N. Korf, and Irkutsk, Nikolay P. 
Ignatyev, recommended constructing the Siberian railroad to Tsar Alexander III to deter 
potential Chinese invasion. Keen to assist the relatively backward Far Eastern region of his 
Empire,12 the tsar ordered a feasibility study for the TSR in 1887.13 Finance Minister Ivan A. 
Vyshnegradsky quashed this plan, however, citing budgetary constraints and the proposed 
construction of a railroad in Persia.14 It took the 17 March 1887 tsarist edict to formalise the plan 
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to connect the entire Siberian region with Europe.15 The benefits of the TSR were substantial,16 
as its opening would ensure year-round mass travel to the eastern periphery and extend the 
Empire’s geostrategic heartland into Northeast Asia, thereby realising Mackinder’s 
“geographical pivot” of history and reshaping Russia’s outlook as the “strategic heartland of 
Northeast Asia”.17  
Construction of the TSR, stretching from Moscow to Vladivostok, began in 1891.18 On 
31 May, Alexander III’s son and successor, Nicholas, laid the foundation stone for the station on 
the Ussuri section.19 At the end of 1891, a special body, the TSR committee, emerged to deal 
with economic development and colonisation of Siberia and, in 1893, Sergei Witte, 
Vyshnegradsky’s successor, became its chairman.20 Russia was able to embark on this ambitious 
project thanks to a formal alliance with France in 1894, a diplomatic arrangement that facilitated 
a bilateral financial partnership;21 and its government recognised the economic value of linking 
European Russia, western Siberia, and the Pacific to match Russia’s political and strategic 
ambitions in the region. 22  Such a strategy also reflected Russia’s embrace of an army-led 
defensive strategy in East Asia after the Port Hamilton incident involving Anglo-Russian 
rivalry,23 owing to the need for quick deployment of troops to the Far East and bolstering the 
defence of its interior.24 
 Russia’s TSR project sparked a senior Japanese Imperial military advisor, Prince 
Yamagata Aritomo, to remark apprehensively in 1892: “Ten years from now, with the 
completion of the Trans-Siberian railway, Russia will be in a position to invade Mongolia, and 
who can tell whether or not in the future she will reach China”.25 Thus, Japan had to consolidate 
its position in Korea before the completion of the TSR, as the “railroad would allow an 
enormous increase in Russia’s power projection capability”.26 Yet, Yamagata recognised that the 
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TSR could advance Japan’s strategic interests in Asia, in 1894, envisaging a new railway that 
could reach the Chinese region that bordered India. 27  His analysis demonstrated his unique 
ability to exploit a strategic competitor’s geostrategic initiative to expand Japan’s hegemonic 
presence in continental Asia. Other Japanese establishment figures also sought to project 
Tokyo’s economic and military power in Korea by controlling its key railroad and, in 1891, the 
Japanese military anticipated the possible strategic role of Korean railroads in future warfare. 
The assistant chief of the army staff, Kawakami Sōroku, advocated a Seoul-Busan railway, with 
Busan potentially serving as “the most probable major port of disembarkation for Japanese 
troops on the continent”.28 The next year, the Japanese consul in Busan surveyed a possible 
Seoul-Busan railway route, and the army general staff, the Foreign Ministry, and Shibusawa 
Eiichi, a stakeholder in the Dai-Ichi Bank, received the report. 29  By the early 1890s, the 
government and private interests in Tokyo were working hand-in-hand to direct Japan’s strategic 
gaze towards Korean railroads. 
In August 1894, as China and Japan edged closer to war, Japan’s minister to Korea, Ōtori 
Keisuke, lobbied the Korean government for rights to build lines linking Seoul, Incheon, and 
Busan; it eventually concluded a provisional agreement with Tokyo. In November, armed with 
this interim accord, a railroad engineer led a team of 100 technicians to assess possible Korean 
routes. Later in 1894, they concocted a ¥2,000,000 plan to construct rail lines for military 
purposes.30 After successfully waging war against China from July 1894 to April 1895, Japan 
dominated the Korean peninsula and obtained Taiwan and an indemnity of about ¥300,000,000 
from Beijing. In February 1895, three Japanese businessmen, Ōmiwa Chōbei, Takeuchi Tsuna, 
and Ōzaki Saburō, resolved to establish a Korean central bank and build two rail lines: Seoul-
Incheon and Seoul-Busan. Ōzaki, a former protégé of ex-Chancellor Sanjō Sanetomi, boasted 
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close ties with bureaucratic circles, and Ōmiwa was a prominent financier. 31  Both Japan’s 
government and business community were keen to exploit the full potential of Korean railroads.    
Against this backdrop, the TSR received a sudden boost when Russia leased the 
Liaodong peninsula from China, an outgrowth of its participation in the Triple Intervention. 
Launched on 23 April, this intrusion involved the Russian, French, and German ministers at 
Tokyo backed by their governments limiting Japan’s hegemonic ambitions in the Far East. They 
argued that the Japanese concession on the Liaodong peninsula threatened both Chinese and 
Korean independence. 32 Subsequently, on 1 August 1895, the British minister at Tokyo, Sir 
Ernest Satow, met with Prime Minister Hirobumi Itō to discuss the Korean peninsula’s shifting 
geopolitical situation. Satow asked whether Russia desired to “bring their railroad through 
Manchuria or to a port in Corea”. The prime minister commented that Russian schemes in Korea 
went far beyond acquiring a port and spoke in favour of Japan’s actions to benefit Korean 
independence. 33  Then on 26 September, Itō took an issue with Satow’s observation, which 
reckoned that some high-ranking Japanese officials believed the object of the Sino-Japanese War 
was to “forestall the completion of the Siberian Railway”.34  Itō’s view of tsarist policy displayed 
Japan’s relatively weak geopolitical position in Korea and, on 3 June 1896, Russia won another 
diplomatic victory with the Li-Lobanov Treaty. This pact secured Chinese agreement to build the 
Chinese Eastern Railroad [CER], which would expedite the transportation of Russian troops to 
Northeast China by linking the TSR with the northeastern Chinese provinces and Vladivostok.35 
Russia made these daring moves because Japan remained too weak militarily to oppose them.36  
However, six days after concluding this treaty, Prince Lobanov, the tsarist foreign 
minister, signed a protocol with Yamagata demonstrating St. Petersburg’s desire to avoid any 
escalation of Russo-Japanese tensions. The Lobanov-Yamagata protocol cemented Russia’s 
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political primacy in Korea by acknowledging the legality of the Korean cabinet formed at the 
Russian legation in Seoul and by giving St. Petersburg the right to despatch troops to Korea in 
case of emergency. 37  Additionally, it paved Russia’s way to obtain special rights in Korea 
through a secret agreement with the Korean minister in Russia, allowing St. Petersburg to 
despatch a financial advisor, military instructors, and several hundred soldiers to Korea.38 It 
enabled the tsarist regime to monitor northern Korea reliably and, from there, protect Russian-
controlled Chinese railroads in Manchuria.39  
The regional balance of power thus appeared to be shifting towards Russia, with Korea 
sheltering under its influence. On 11 February 1896, because of Japanese interference in Korean 
politics, including the assassination of the Korean empress, Min, who looked for closer Russian 
ties to counter the Japanese, the emperor, Gojong, fled to the Russian legation, creating an 
atmosphere conducive to more effective railroad diplomacy. He ruled from the legation for a 
year. Despite the Korean sovereign’s intent, Russo-Japanese tensions surrounding Korean 
railroads soon resurfaced. In August, drawing on a tentative 20 August 1894 agreement between 
Korea and Japan,40 Tokyo pressed Seoul to relinquish the Gyeongbu Railway concession – from 
Seoul to Busan. Fortunately for St. Petersburg, determined to construct the railway itself, the 
Korean government rejected Tokyo’s demand.41 Russia, however, could not rest its laurels. The 
Japanese head of the Seoul Residents Association, Yamaguchi Tabei, offered ¥50,000 to the 
Korean foreign minister not to turn over the Seoul-Uiju line to a French company, Fives-Lille.42 
The Japanese Chamber of Commerce in Seoul and its Incheon, Busan, and Wonsan counterparts 
called for securing the Seoul-Busan railway construction rights. Yamaguchi justified their 
position in June 1896: “When the trans-Siberian railway is eventually completed, the [Seoul-
Busan] line will connect our country with Russia, and [as] a main line piercing the European and 
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Asian continents, inevitably it will be of the utmost importance in the intercourse between East 
and West”.43 A month later, another well-connected Japanese businessman, Maejima Hisoka, 
backed the Seoul-Busan railway concession, recognising the scheme’s potential importance: 
“The railways from the eastern end of the Korean peninsula . . . [are] a gateway to the great 
railways between Asia and Europe . . . if we take no notice . . . it will immediately pass into the 
hands of some other country”.44  
Keen interest in Korean railroads amongst Japan’s private sector seemed ironic as senior-
level government officials were treading carefully. Itō and Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu 
remained sceptical of the Seoul-Busan line’s profitability, given Korea’s weak economy and low 
population density. 45  Furthermore, Itō closely watched the other Powers’ possible responses 
opposing Japan’s control of the railway.46 Russia searched for countermoves against Japan in 
Korea, although on non-official levels. On 30 July 1896, a tsarist railroad engineer, Tolmache, 
had submitted a policy recommendation to the Finance Ministry to construct a new line 
connecting Vladivostok and a port on Korea Bay. He argued that if a port in northwest Korea 
linked with the TSR, it would help Russia gain advantages in global trade and control the Korea 
Strait. Tolmache posited that Russia would then be able to block the advance of a third Power’s 
fleet into the East Sea and transform the Korean peninsula into a buffer.47 In a report on 7 
October 1896, an official at the Russo-Chinese Bank, Dimitri Dimitrievich Pokotilov, considered 
using Russia’s track gauge for Korean railroads. 
Other Western Powers also pursued forward policies, making inroads on Korean railroad 
concessions. America worked with the moderate Russian chargé d´affaires to Korea, Karl 
Ivanovich Waeber, to adopt a European-style standard gauge for Korean railroads, whilst France 
acquired the Seoul-Uiju railroad concession to connect with a possible Russian-built railroad in 
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southern Korea. 48  Perhaps conducive to Russian interests foreshadowing St. Petersburg’s 
expanding influence over Korean railroads, French action came with a caveat: Russia could only 
rely on the goodwill of France, its principal ally 
Ultimately, Japan consumed most of Pokotilov’s energy. Wondering whether the sudden 
departure of the Japanese minister to Korea presaged Japan taking a hard line on Korea, he noted 
that even this moderate official had requested that Korea’s government furnish new details about 
the status of the Seoul-Busan railroad. 49  Then, on 22 October, Witte urged acting Foreign 
Minister Nikolay Shishkin to pressure Seoul to adopt Russian-style broad gauge.  Witte faulted 
Gojong’s edict of 15 July 1896 designating European-standard gauge for the construction of the 
Gyeongin Seoul-Incheon and Gyeongui Seoul-Uiju railroads. He foresaw potential difficulties 
for Russo-Korean trade if the soon-to-be-built CER adopted a narrower gauge: a different 
Russian standard from Korea’s would cost time and money. Thus, Witte concluded that future 
Korean railroads use broad gauge and have Gojong’s edict annulled. 
Witte did not have to fear a negative Japanese reaction over his Korean railroad designs. 
On 14 November, Satow met with the influential Count Ōkuma Shigenobu, a former foreign 
minister, who asserted, “All that Japan desired was . . . the independence of Corea”. Whilst 
seeking to take the Russian advance in Korean railroads lightly, Ōkuma acknowledged Tokyo’s 
continued interest in important railways: “A line from Seoul to Fusan could not possibly be made 
a financial success, but one to Mokpo might . . . which gives access to the most fertile region in 
Corea”. Witte eventually got his wish when Gojong found himself forced to proclaim a new edict 
selecting Russian-style broad gauge for Korean railroads, encapsulating the growing Korean 
alignment with Russia’s strategic ambitions in the Far East. 
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Gojong’s sudden volte-face may have induced Ōmiwa to return to Tokyo in December. 
Although blaming an economic recession in Japan for temporarily shelving the Seoul-Busan 
railroad project, Ōmiwa argued against its abandonment: “The Seoul-Pusan railway is a national 
issue and [its fate] should not be determined by the ups and downs of the economy”. 50 His 
remark presaged that Korea’s railroads would remain Japan’s fixation. On 20 February 1897, 
Gojong returned to his palace from the Russian legation and established the Korean Empire on 
12 October to counter better foreign intervention in the country’s internal affairs and embark on 
comprehensive internal reforms to build up national strength capable of withstanding foreign 
pressures. Coincidentally, the conclusion of the Waeber-Komura memorandum of July 1896, 
allowing Russia to station troops in Korea and requiring Japan acknowledging Korea’s pro-
Russian bias, and Lobanov-Yamagata protocol established a relative balance of power on the 
peninsula, giving Gojong’s government breathing space to pursue a more independent foreign 
policy.  
Nonetheless, Japan’s new prime minister, Matsukata Masayoshi, and his foreign minister, 
Ōkuma Shigenobu, were eager to regain the upper hand in Korea. Using the Foreign Ministry’s 
advisor, H.W. Denison, an American, as a go-between, Ōkuma pushed for negotiations with an 
American investor, James Morse, to acquire the Seoul-Incheon railway. 51 The idea was that 
Shibusawa would form a syndicate and offer ¥2,000,000 to Morse to purchase the railway after it 
was completed.52 In July, negotiations between Morse and the Shibusawa-led syndicate over 
transferring construction rights to the Seoul-Incheon railway broke down after the American 
demanded $300,000. Concerned that the railway might fall to hostile Powers, Ōkuma arranged 
for the Yokohama Specie Bank to lend Morse $500,000 in return for constructing the railroad 
and dropping his latest demand to the syndicate.53 
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Spurred on by their government’s active engagement in the race for the Seoul-Incheon 
railroad, the syndicate sought direct assistance from Tokyo. In October, asking for a ¥1,000,000 
loan without any fixed date, syndicate leaders demanded the government guarantee an interest-
free loan if the railway’s annual profit fell below ¥50,000. To support this loan, Matsukata had a 
portion of the China indemnity deposited in the Yokohama Specie Bank as collateral.54 Against 
this backdrop, Gojong held an audience with French minister to Korea, Victor Collin de Plancy. 
He called for an equal distribution of railroads amongst the major Powers to draw foreign capital 
and strategic focus to Korea,55 claiming that multilateral engagement could constrain Japanese 
and Russian infringement on Korea’s sovereignty; he did not mention that Korea would remain 
dependent on the imperial Powers. Interventions in unofficial channels further complicated 
Korea's already fraught concession diplomacy. A Korean pro-reform group, the Independence 
Club, comprised of enlightened young intellectuals and former bureaucrats, advocated a more 
independent, neutral foreign policy. More significantly, championing patriotic nationalism 
through their newspaper, The Independent, Club members pushed the government for at least 
some level of accountability by the major Powers.56   
Its sentiments towards foreign Powers were inconsistent, but the Club correctly 
understood Russia’s strategic intent towards the Korean peninsula, demonstrated by a strongly-
worded March 1897 policy report by the tsarist Finance Ministry chief of staff, Romanoff. 
Noting that Manchuria was nothing more than a passage to Korea, he sought a railroad that 
would reach an ice-free port on the Korean peninsula. 57  This proposal paved the way for 
Romanoff’s support for creating the Russo-Korean Bank. With the Russia-controlled-CER 
serving as its holding company, this financial institution could inject 2.1 million roubles for 
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financing the construction of a new railroad from Manchuria to a Korean port.58 An ice-free 
Korean port with access to the Pacific could serve as a CER terminal.59 
Determined to make economic inroads into the Korean peninsula, Witte’s Finance 
Ministry wanted a Russian-sponsored Korean railroad project. In contrast, the Foreign Ministry 
preferred a more low-key approach, epitomised by Foreign Minister Mikhail Muraviev’s stance 
towards Tokyo. Consequently, Japan’s foreign minister, Nishi Tokujirō, was ready to proffer a 
Russian free hand in Manchuria for a Japanese one in Korea – passing a note concerning this 
subject to Baron Roman Romanovich Rosen, Russia’s minister at Tokyo.60 He later reported to 
Nishi that St. Petersburg was glad that Japan had acknowledged that Manchuria was not part of 
its sphere of interest.61 The mystifying aspect of such confusion amongst tsarist officialdom was 
that Russian influence in Korea was reaching a new high.62 In July 1897, three officers and ten 
non-commissioned officers were sent to Seoul to train Korean soldiers, and Alexis de Speyer, 
heading the Russian legation in Korea, worked diligently to secure tsarist economic and political 
privileges. Four months after its soldiers arrived, Russia secured control of Korean customs. 
Outside Korea, however, Russia was making little headway. Although the Ussuri line 
from Vladivostok to Khabarovsk opened in 1897, 63  the Foreign Ministry and front-line 
diplomats like Waeber proved reluctant to pursue a more interventionist policy; the Finance 
Ministry still embraced a hard line. In an important sense, there seemed to be no “government” 
in Russia.64 On 25 February 1898, Witte penned a text on the Gyeongin Railway concession, 
urging Deputy Foreign Minister Count Vladimir Nikolayevich Lamsdorff to sponsor Russian 
industrialists’ purchase of this strategic railroad. Worried that Fives-Lille ceding the railway to 
the Russian government would complicate Russo-Japanese relations, 65  Witte suggested the 
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Russo-Korean Bank as a substitute. 66  His stance encapsulated the dilemma of maximising 
Russian interests in Korean railroads whilst not provoking a strong Japanese response.  
Unlike Russia, Japan was having a little trouble in doubling down on its Korean railroad 
geostrategy, forcing the Russian chargé d’affaires to Korea, N.G. Matyunin, to pen an alarming 
report in 1897 on Japanese intrigues regarding the Gyeongbu Railway. Recalling a recent 
meeting with Japanese minister to Korea, Katō Matsuo, Matyunin claimed Japan acquired this 
railway to colonise its neighbour.67 He also reported on John McLeavy Brown, the British chief 
commissioner of customs and financial advisor to the Korean government, and his unwillingness 
to co-operate with Russia.68 It was no secret that with Anglo-Russian rivalry in Eurasia in full 
swing, any Russian action on the Korean peninsula would be interpreted as hostile towards 
Britain, especially its interests in continental Asia. Witte, however, refused to budge and in late 
December 1897 telegraphed Muravyev stressing the participation of foreign enterprises in the 
Seoul-Incheon railroad was impossible. 69  Even the usually cautious Muravyov instructed 
Matyunin in early January 1898 to monitor the railroad’s status, as this vital concession should 
not fall to a foreign government.70  
Then, in mid-January 1898, Witte suddenly backpedalled from involving Russian 
institutions in its concession competition with Japan. Perhaps frustrated by the continued 
confusion surrounding ownership rights of the Seoul-Incheon railroad, he now opposed any 
Russian investment in Korean businesses, a decision officially couched in business terms, 
although the detrimental impact of persistent confusion amongst Russian officialdom 
surrounding a railroad concession was taking its toll.71 Despite facing such obstacles, individual 
Russian diplomats remained attentive to fresh developments regarding Korean railroads. On 29 
January, Admiral Yevgeni Alexeiev, the Russian Far Eastern viceroy, reported an offer from a 
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Morse representative about the repayment of ¥750,000 to an unnamed Japanese bank in 
exchange for ending Japan’s involvement.72 Though Witte asked Alexeiev not to take part in the 
Gyeongin Railway concession issue,73 the latter would not budge. 
Alexeiev noted that only by purchasing the Gyeongin Railway or obtaining its shares 
could Russia have the railway adopt its preferred gauge.74 Subsequently, on 23 January 1898, an 
aide of the foreign minister delivered Matyunin’s letter and an attachment on a conversation 
between him and the Paris branch manager of the Russo-Chinese Bank about the purchase of the 
railway through a syndicate comprising a French railroad company and the Russo-Chinese Bank. 
By requesting Witte’s feedback,75 the Foreign Ministry was intimating the Russian government’s 
possible involvement in acquiring a key railroad concession. On 4 February, Alexeiev sought to 
push for a more forceful stance regarding the Gyeongin and Gyeongui railways, referring to an 
offer from a Fives-Lille representative. He revealed that in return for St Petersburg covering four 
percent of its annual income, the company promised to purchase Morse’s company and construct 
an Incheon-Seoul-Uiju rail-line.76 
Intervention from France’s ambassador to Russia, Gustave Lannes de Montebello, 
followed Alexeiev’s report on Russian policy towards Korean railroads. By sharing a copy of a 
letter from the representative of Fives-Lille, which invited the tsarist government to buy the 
entire railroad line in return for compensation of its lost profits, France sought to leverage the 
Franco-Russian alliance for mutual benefits. Lamsdorff, now foreign minister, thought this 
suggestion merited serious consideration, prompting the Foreign Ministry to review its Korean 
policy. 77 Subsequent developments surrounding the Gyeongin Railroad concession, however, 
showed that time was not in Russia’s side. In late April, the American minister to Korea, Horace 
Newton Allen, wrote Matyunin that a Japanese syndicate loan could underwrite the railroad’s 
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construction.78 Russia was inadvertently letting Japan race ahead in their rivalry over Korea. 
Concurrently, Japan was setting its gaze on the Seoul-Busan railway concession. Matsuo played 
a critical role in inducing Gojong’s government to grant this railway to Japan.79 He also worked 
with Takeuchi Tsuna and Ōe Taku, a director of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, to curb the activities 
of the Independence Club, perhaps finding its advocacy of neutral and independent foreign 
policies detrimental to Japanese interests in Korean railroads.80 
Fulfilling such ambitions was not without challenges. Feigning the possible reaction from 
Russia, many Korean officials favoured building the Seoul-Busan railway independently or 
giving construction rights to an American concessionaire.81 Nevertheless, Katō could still rest 
easy, as Allen was unwilling to undermine Japan’s designs on Korean railroads. Now that Morse 
was seeking to sell his stake in the Seoul-Incheon line, the American diplomat offered two 
Japan-friendly alternatives to the Korean government in July. The first would have Korea borrow 
from Japan to build and operate the line. The second would include the Seoul-Busan route and 
have the Japanese syndicate complete it. Both options would benefit America’s economic 
interests, as Japan could purchase construction materials, rolling stock, and other related 
materials from the United States.82 More crucially, Allen noted that even the Korean finance 
minister favoured granting a railroad concession to Tokyo.83 
The Nishi-Rosen protocol of 25 April 1898 gave Japan another reason to feel more 
confident about its geopolitical standing in Korea. Devised to allow both Powers to pursue their 
respective interests on the Korean peninsula, it enabled Japan to pursue “unnoticed peaceful 
penetration”, enabling it to make headway on railroad concessions in Korea.84 Wrapped in geo-
politics and keen to establish a Pacific-based fleet in Vladivostok and Manchuria’s Port Arthur, 
St. Petersburg desired free passage in the Korea Straits, hoping to lease a port in southern 
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Korea.85 An additional twist to these intrigues was that some Koreans felt their country should 
adopt defensive mechanisms – however ineffective – to preserve its fragile sovereignty amidst 
the latest round of Russo-Japanese railroad competition. On 6 July, the Koreans established the 
Directorate of Railroads, with Yongik Yi as its supervisor, to preserve public railroads, approve 
and administer private railroads, disburse taxes, oversee expenses, and purchase and store 
expropriated goods.  
Furthermore, on 21 August, the Korean government contemplated surveying routes for 
independent construction of Seoul-Mokpo, Seoul-Wonsan-Gyeongheung, Wonsan-Pyongyang-
Jinnampo and Gyeongheung-Uiju railroads. These four lines would facilitate Korean economic 
development.86 Unofficial circles in Korea also stepped up efforts to have their say in railroad 
concessions. On 29 October, the Independence Club submitted six policy recommendations to 
Gojong, including for Korean railroads. Having commended the government’s refusal to grant 
the Gyeongwon Railway – Seoul to Wonsan – to the German firm, Heinrich Constantin Edward 
Meyer and Company, the Club now demanded the government grant concessions only after 
obtaining joint signatures from the cabinet and chair of the High State Council.87 Under these 
circumstances, an ex-Korean official, Byeonghun Jeon, attempted to direct Gojong’s attention 
towards Korean neutralisation. As a former bureaucrat, Jeon might have been able to devise a 
pragmatic solution, having witnessed the impact of his government’s foreign policy in the 
geopolitical landscape of the Far East. Neutralisation could at least mitigate the effects of the 
Russo-Japanese tug-of-war over Korea and, by extension, its railroads.  
On 1 January 1899, Jeon submitted a memorial to Gojong, drawing on the Gongbeop 
pyeollam – Handbook of International Law – to scrutinise Belgium and Switzerland’s 
experiences as independent and neutral states. He contended that Korea could emulate their 
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success by despatching official correspondence to friendly countries and by receiving their 
recognition within two or three years, thereby help Korea avoid external aggression. Gojong 
deemed Jeon’s memorial appropriate,88 yet did not pursue a follow-up measure. He may have 
balked at neutralisation’s effectiveness as a balancing mechanism on the international stage. 
Worse was to come. In February 1899, under pressure, the Korean government signed a 
new loan agreement specifying that Seoul repay its 1895 loan to Tokyo in instalments. On 14 
March, Tokyo unveiled another scheme requiring that Gojong’s government borrow ¥1,000,000 
from a Japanese syndicate to advance the Gyeongin Railway project, manifesting a close 
connexion between railroad concessions and loans. Apart from increasing Japan’s financial 
leverage over Korea, these measures would enable the Japanese to pass to Korea’s government at 
least some of the operating losses incurred from operating the Gyeongin Railway.89 Furthermore, 
Russia’s minister to Korea, Alexander Ivanovich Pavloff, deduced that not blind to Japan’s 
ulterior motives, Brown was working to build a rapport with Kato. The Russian diplomat tried to 
warn the Korean foreign minister about Japan’s real intentions but failed.90  
Meanwhile, Fives-Lille faced unexpected hurdles in its railroad project. Although the 
company initially acquired the Gyeongui Railway, a lack of capital and a deliberate French 
policy of enhanced disengagement from Korea meant no tangible benefits accrued from 
maintaining the railway.91 Because French financial assistance was helping to construct the TSR, 
Russia could not extend similar support to Fives-Lille.92 Whilst Fives-Lille benefited from the 
Korean government’s goodwill towards a third Power, once it embarked on the formal 
construction process, it lacked inadequate capital. Thus, in late May, Fives-Lille approached 
Tokyo about transferring its railway concession. In a surprising turn of events, Japanese officials 
were unable to act on this offer: Japan’s domestic consensus now favoured constructing the 
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Gyeongbu Railway first.93 A large-scale military build-up was another distracting factor; on 5 
April, Satow privately noted, “Japanese naval and military preparations are not ready yet”. 
Displaying remarkable foresight, he predicted that when the TSR was finished in five years, “a 
great struggle will take place”.94 He failed to predict the exact date for the Russo-Japanese war, 
but grasped the strategic importance of the TSR in Russo-Japanese rivalry.   
Japan also had to reckon with Russian designs on the port of Masanpo, the starting point 
of Japan’s railroad project in Korea.95 The Russian navy was attempting to obtain a parcel of 
land at Masanpo, which compelled Colonel Tamura Iyozō to obtain landing facilities there for 
the potential use of the Japanese army. Tamura recognised the strategic importance of the 
Korean port: “if Russia gets her hands on Masampo, Japan must become useless”.96 Meanwhile, 
the Korean government dabbled in efforts again to construct a railway independently; it awarded 
the rights to build the Gyeongwon Railway in June to the private Korea Railroad and Delivery 
Service Company. A month later, the Company received the equivalent right for the Gyeongui 
Railway after Fives-Lille lost its construction rights.97 Despite these steps, the Korean company 
failed to raise sufficient capital for railroad projects. Eventually, Gojong’s government stepped 
into the breach, delegating railroad-related duties to the Imperial Household Department and 
creating the Railroad Bureau on 1 April 1900 to administer the Gyeongin98 and Gyeongbu99 
railways. Korea was indicating that even if a foreign Power received these concessions, Seoul 
would administer and supervise the resulting railroads. On 13 September, Korea’s government 
founded the Northwestern Railroad Bureau, with Yongik as president, to construct the Gyeongui 
and Gyeongwon railways under the direct control of the Imperial Household Department.100 
As Korea contemplated ways to revive its stalled railroad-building programme, Russia 
toyed with Korean neutrality in January 1901, looking to counterbalance the increased influence 
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of Japan on the Korean peninsula. Working through its minister in Japan, Alexander Petrovich 
Izvolsky, St. Petersburg sought to revisit the Nish-Rosen protocol, aware that Tokyo used this 
accord to increase its geo-economic presence on the Korean peninsula through railways, 
telegraph, banking, and other means. Hirobumi was interested in taking up this offer, but not his 
foreign minister Katō Takaaki: “The 1898 protocol is still in force and seems to work fairly 
well . . . . it would be well to postpone negotiations until the status quo ante [in Manchuria] shall 
have been restored”. 101 Japan was unwilling to entertain Korean neutrality, considering it 
unconnected with the Russo-Japanese competition over their respective spheres of influence. 
Such a stance meant that the Russo-Japanese rivalry over Korean railroads would heat up in the 
absence of a stabilising mechanism – neutrality. Concluded on 30 January 1902, the Anglo-
Japanese alliance identified Russia as a chief rival in the Far East. More strikingly, Article 1 of 
the agreement stipulated that Japan had a special stake in Korean politics and economy.102 This 
provision strengthened Japan’s hand in the Russo-Japanese contest over Korean railroads, with 
the Japan Times reckoning that Article 1 was “a powerful factor in shaping the course of events 
in the Extreme East”.103 
What could easily be described as a unilateral move by Japan against the regional balance 
of power may have been caused by Russia exploiting the anti-Great Power Boxer Uprising in 
China in June 1900 as an ideal opportunity to occupy Manchuria. Having identified Korean 
railroads as a strategic link for Japan’s expansion into Manchuria, Tokyo had to respond to the 
Russian offensive there. Accordingly, when the hard liner, Komura Jutarō, became foreign 
minister in September 1901, Japan quickly pushed for a more detailed plan to control the 
Gyeongui Railway. By acquiring this concession, it could pose a serious threat to Russia, as the 
completed railway would terminate in Manchuria.104 Japan also contemplated extending a loan 
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to Korea105 and, with the Gyeongui Railway and maritime customs revenue as collateral, such an 
action would strengthen Tokyo’s grip on the Korean economy.106  
Backed by the successful conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, Komura’s hard line 
Korean policy affected Korea’s domestic politics. The pro-Japan faction in Seoul became the 
dominant political force, pushing through its hegemonic agenda for Korean railroads. Even 
Yongik, a non-faction member, found himself sidelined after failing to introduce the French-
backed Unnam syndicate loan in April 1901.107  Still, Russia felt it was losing a strategic edge 
over Japan in the Far East. St. Petersburg already faced the possible acceleration of the open door 
policy in Manchuria by signing a Russo-Chinese Convention on the evacuation of Manchuria on 
8 April 1902. Moreover, America’s growing rapprochement with Britain and Japan further 
complicated Russia’s desire to maintain its influence in Manchuria.108  
Thus, instead of directly challenging Japanese efforts to dominate Korean railroads, the 
Russians decided on a diplomatic option to reshape the geopolitics of the Korean peninsula, 
imposing some constraints on growing Japanese domination over railroads. Such a rationale 
explains why in September 1902, Pavloff decided to join Izvolsky and the Russian ambassador at 
Washington, Arturo Cassini, to press for Korea’s neutralisation. On 31 July 1902, he travelled to 
Tokyo to confer with Izvolsky about neutralisation under a joint Russo-Japanese-American 
guarantee. Then, in early September, he went to Paris to discuss the plan with Cassini. 109 
Afterwards the three diplomats formed a consensus over the execution of their joint proposal, 
counting on American support. 110  The three may have sought to involve the United States 
because of its substantial economic interests in Korea and lingering pro-American sympathies 
there. In addition, the purported inclination of Washington to accept Russia’s stake in Manchuria 
may have convinced them that the United States would likewise accept Russia’s Korean 
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policy.111 Their optimism lay with John Hay, the American secretary of state.112  As long as 
guaranteeing freedom of American commerce and enterprises in Manchuria, the United States 
would not interrupt Russian activities.  
Meanwhile, America’s minister to Japan, Alfred Eliab Buck, alerted Komura about the 
Russian diplomats’ neutralisation scheme, prompting Komura to wire his minister at St. 
Petersburg, Kurino Shin’ichiro, on 9 September to monitor the plan’s progress. Komura asked 
Buck to relay his hopes directly to Washington that if Russia made approaches about Korean 
neutralisation, it would consult with Tokyo. He also declared that Japan would not accept any 
move to change its current position in Korea and that the Russian diplomats’ plan could threaten 
Japan’s position in Korea.113 The next day, Komura instructed Kurino to forward the contents of 
his message to other foreign representatives in France and the United States and ordered Japan’s 
minister at Washington, Takahira Kogorō, to monitor Cassini closely, as well as the American 
attitude towards the Russian proposition.114 Whilst not explicitly stated, the Japanese diplomatic 
establishment was wary of Russo-American co-operation in Korea, although Buck’s action 
showed little chance for such collaboration. 
On 22 September, Komura divulged the Russian diplomats’ neutralisation plan to 
Hayashi and expressed concern about Waeber's upcoming visit to Korea. Even though Lamsdorff 
attempted to address Kurino’s anxiety by reassuring him that Waeber’s visit had nothing to do 
with Korean neutralisation,  Komura dreaded the possibility the neutralisation debate retaking 
centre stage. To avoid this scenario, Katō tried to turn the three Russian diplomats’ plan to 
Japan’s advantage. 115  On 6 October, Hay told Takahira that America had not received any 
Russian request to consider Korean neutralisation. Unwilling to take any chances, Takahira met 
Hay three more times to disrupt Russia's designs. He discerned that the United States had neither 
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considered participating in the joint guarantee nor received a Korean neutrality proposal from 
Russians.116 The Japanese diplomat once again spoke to Hay on 2 September 1903 about the 
neutralisation proposal and came away convinced that it had not reached the United States.117  
In an October 1902 report, Hayashi speculated about a possible neutralisation discussion 
between Korea and Russia during Waeber’s visit to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of 
Gojong’s accession to the throne. Hayashi conjectured that Waeber might join hands with some 
pro-Russian faction members, surmising these marginalised political elites looked to recover 
their influence within the Korean government. 118  Around this time, Allen asked Hayashi 
Gonsuke, a senior Foreign Ministry official, about the three Russian diplomats’ proposal. 
Hayashi replied that Japan did not support it because the Russian government was using it to 
secure freedom of manoeuvre in Manchuria, and he later added that since the Russian diplomats’ 
proposal violated the open door policy, Japan would not accept it. Hayashi also said if the 
American government shared this view, it should approve of Japan’s decision.119 Having sensed 
a crisis due to Komura’s hard-line posture in Korea and the establishment of the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance, the three Russian diplomats’ initiative strongly reflected the tsar’s view.120 Given this 
reality, despite its evident setback, the proposal was Russia’s countermove against Japan, whose 
position in the Far East was strengthening through the Anglo-Japanese alliance.121  
Going forward, several issues further threatened the status quo in Russo-Japanese 
competition over Korea. These involved suspending the scheduled second-round withdrawal of 
Russian troops from Manchuria on 8 April 1903, the outline of seven conditions for their 
withdrawal on 18 April, and Russia’s occupation of Yongampo on 21 April to construct a 
strategic post under the guise of a logging venture on 4 May.122 It inevitably had important 
implications for the railroads, as Japan might interpret these moves as Russian willingness to 
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expand its Manchurian and Korean interests.123 To rub salt into the wound, the British minister at 
Seoul and his Japanese counterpart pressured Gojong into declaring the opening of the Yalu 
River to trade.124 Feeling desperate, the Russians looked for a strategic opening to redress the 
situation. On 22 May, a financier and confidante of Nicholas II, Alexsandr Mikhailovich 
Bezobrazov, insisted in not allowing Japan to extend its influence into northern Korea. He also 
argued that Russia should receive concessions corresponding to Japan’s construction rights for 
the Gyeongbu and Gyeongui railways.125 However, St. Petersburg soon realised the difficulty in 
matching intentions with deeds, given Japanese moves in Korea. Pavloff reported that Brown 
was working with the Japanese minister to have the Korean government proclaim Yongampo an 
open port.126 Moreover, buoyed by the perceived weaknesses of Russian forces and regarding 
Japan and Russia as now on an equal military footing, the Japanese Army Chief of Staff Ōyama 
Iwao maintained that now was the time to settle the Korea problem.127  
At this critical juncture, out of desperation, Gojong resorted to neutralisation. 128  He 
despatched two close aides –Yeongun Hyeon to Japan on 3 August129 and Sanggeon Hyeon to 
Europe 18 days later – to seek support for Korea’s wartime neutrality. 130  Sanggeon Hyeon 
carried a letter from Gojong pushing for accelerating Russo-Korean co-operation, hoping to 
prevent a Japanese invasion of the peninsula in the event of Russo-Japanese war. 131  His 
European trip was notable for ascertaining French and Russian views on Korean neutralisation 
and seeking international mediation.132 The mission marked a significant departure for Korea, 
involving direct communication with potential allies for Korean neutralisation. Sanggeon Hyeon 
first tried to arrange a meeting with French foreign minister, Théophile Déclassé. When this 
failed, a Korean envoy left a copy of a secret message from Gojong to Yeongchan Min, the 
Korean minister in France, regarding neutrality.133 Sanggeon Hyeon then considered attending 
24 
 
the International Peace Conference and visiting the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, 
but neither was in session. He finally travelled to St. Petersburg, conferring with Korea’s 
minister to Russia, Beomjin Yi, about neutrality and meeting with Waeber. On his journey back 
to Korea, Sanggeon Hyeon stopped at Lüshun, where he spoke with the Russian governor of the 
Far East. 134  For all his efforts, Hyeon could not receive any tangible support for Korean 
neutrality.135 In Japan, Komura tried to use the Korean overture to push instead for a bilateral 
Korean-Japanese alliance.136 Although having invested considerable political capital in pushing 
his neutralisation drive through direct diplomacy, Gojong could not receive reliable support from 
the international community.  
Korea’s neutralisation drive may have hit a roadblock, but that did not stop Russia from 
presenting a separate initiative to Japan on 3 October, which included designating a neutral zone 
north of the 39th parallel of the Korean peninsula.137 Komura rebuffed the Russian olive branch 
in a counterproposal four weeks later.138 Determined to connect the Gyeongui Railway with 
Manchuria, Japan demanded St. Petersburg not disrupt the expansion of this line into 
Manchuria.139 In the end, Japan was unable to bridge any differences on Korea and Manchuria 
with Russia, and bilateral attempts to break the diplomatic deadlock ended. On 6 February 1904, 
the Japanese government unilaterally decided to construct the Gyeongui Railway to transport 
troops to the front line, and two days later, the Russo-Japanese war broke out when the Japanese 
navy launched a surprise attack on Russian warships at Port Arthur. On 21 February, the 
Japanese Army established a temporary unit in charge of maintaining military continental 
railways, aiming to incorporate them in Japanese military operations.140 
The end of Korea’s fragile hold on its railroads came on 23 February when the fourth 
article of a new Korean-Japanese protocol granted Japan the use of all Korea for military 
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purposes.141 Japan could now use this accord as diplomatic cover to justify controlling Korea’s 
major railways and advance Japan’s hegemonic interests regarding those in Manchuria. Japan’s 
success in obtaining control of Korean railroads reversed Russian advantages. After completing 
the CER in 1903, St. Petersburg initially expected this strategic line to enhance its military 
activities in the Far East. With war between Japan and Russia drawing closer, the tsar’s 
government sought to develop the CER further “to make it a more efficient military carrier”.142 
Such a step would have enabled more rapid transportation of its troops into Harbin in Manchuria 
and force Japan to counter with costly defensive measures.143 In the end, hemmed in by adverse 
geographical conditions for fighting in Manchuria – crossing Siberia’s Lake Baikal with 
reinforcements and supplies during the winter was only possible with an icebreaker and sleds – 
and inflexible military strategy, Russia sorely missed access to strategic railroads. In contrast, 
Japan easily relied on Korea’s railroads, and Japanese military forces outpaced their Russian 
counterparts in terms of logistics and supply, at least in the initial phases of the conflict.       
In this analysis, Russo-Japanese rivalry over the Korean peninsula occurred within the 
context of railroad concessions, with neutralisation playing a complementary role. Focusing on 
major issues related to these important subjects, scholars can form a more nuanced understanding 
of Korea’s close connexion with Far Eastern geopolitics, imperial rivalries, and the balance of 
power. Russo-Japanese rivalry over the Korean peninsula would formally conclude after 
Russia’s defeat in the 1904-1905 war. The Treaty of Portsmouth ending the struggle on 5 
September 1905 granted Japan economic and political supremacy over Korea, and Tokyo used 
this treaty as a stepping-stone to consolidate its hegemony over the Korean peninsula. It meant 
Korea’s railroads would also fall firmly under Japanese control. In the final analysis, Korea was 
unable to protect a potentially valuable asset from foreign encroachment. Forced to outsource 
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railroad construction and authority to foreign Powers, Korea’s fate was soon no longer under its 
control. Those Powers were determined to maximise their own hegemonic ambitions or 
commercial interests in the Far East by manipulating Korean railroad concessions.  
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